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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)

NO. 40930

)
)

vs.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW

)
)
)

WILLIAM JACK BIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' November 6, 2014
opinion in which the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order denying Bias'
motion for substitute counsel to pursue a post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. State v. Bias, Docket No. 40930, 2014 Opinion No. 94 (Idaho App., Nov. 6, 2014)
(hereinafter "Opinion"). The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order based on
its determinations that Bias had a statutory right to conflict-free counsel to pursue his
post-judgment motions; that the statutory right imposed upon the district court the same
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affirmative duty to inquire into the basis for Bias' request for substitute counsel as would
be required under the Sixth Amendment; and that the district court failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry before ruling on the motion. Review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion
is appropriate because the reasoning and holdings therein are contrary to both this
Court's precedent and prior Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent regarding the scope of
the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.

For the Court's convenience, a

copy of the Court of Appeals' Opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings In District Court
In September 2012, an officer observed Bias' vehicle "drifting in its lane, driving
on top of the white fog line, traveling under the speed limit, and then braking hard when
approaching a curve in the road." (PSI, p.3.) When stopped by the officer, Bias stated
"he did not have a driver's license, was 'not sure' about his registration and insurance,
and didn't know his address."

(PSI, p.3.)

The officer smelled the odor of alcohol

coming from the vehicle and "observed a partially empty bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey
and a six pack of mostly consumed Smirnoff mixed alcohol bottles in the back seat."
(PSI, p.3.) Bias' 17-year-old son was in the vehicle and "admitted to having taken a
'bug gulp,' of his Dad's whiskey and coke, from the bottle located on the console
between the front seats." (PSI, pp.3-4.) Bias claimed ownership of the alcohol and
admitted he had been drinking. (PSI, p.3.) His eyes were "red, glassy and watery" and
his speech was "slow and lethargic."

(PSI, p.3.)

He failed field sobriety tests and

subsequent evidentiary testing showed he had a BAC of .107/.106. (PSI, p.4.)
The state charged Bias with felony DUI (three or more DUI convictions in 10
years) and misdemeanor injury to child. (R., pp.36-38.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
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Bias pied guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charge. (R., pp.4546.) The district court accepted Bias' plea and imposed a unified sentence of 10 years,
with five years fixed. (R., pp.50-52.) Bias timely appealed. (R., pp.55-57.) He also
filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.53-54.)
Before the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion, Bias filed a prose motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

(Augmentation:

"Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea And

Supporting Information" (hereinafter "Motion To Withdraw Plea"), filed June 4, 2013.)
As the basis for his motion, Bias asserted he had entered his plea on the advice of
counsel and under a good faith belief that counsel had provided him with adequate
information concerning his defenses. (Motion to Withdraw Plea.) Bias further asserted
that, "[u]pon further investigation[]," he discovered counsel was aware of, but "neglected
to pursue possible defenses previous to [his] plea of Guilty" and, according to Bias,
"said defenses would have provided a substantially different outcome."
Withdraw Plea.)

(Motion to

Bias also filed a pro se motion for the appointment of counsel to

pursue the motion for withdrawal of his plea, asserting therein that the failure of his
previously appointed counsel to "adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit [had]
caused

the

Attorney/Client

relationship

to

become

irreparably

damaged."

(Augmentation: "Motion For Appointment Of Counsel And Supporting Information"
(hereinafter "Motion for Counsel"), filed June 4, 2013.)
At a hearing on June 24, 2013, the district court took up Bias' Rule 35 motion and
his pro se motions for the appointment of counsel and withdrawal of his guilty plea.
(See generally 6/24/13 Tr.)

Bias was not present at the hearing, but his previously

appointed trial counsel argued the Rule 35 motion on Bias' behalf. (6/24/13 Tr., p.16,
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Ls.7-13, p.17, Ls.8-22.) Counsel did not argue the merits of Bias' prose motions but
advised the court that he (counsel) had essentially construed those motions as a
petition for post-conviction relief. (Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.7.) The district court agreed
with counsel's characterization of Bias' pro se motions as reading like a post-conviction
petition and, ultimately, denied them, reasoning:
The Defendant is asking for the Court to appoint new counsel for
him while his case is under appeal, under the circumstances I don't think
the Court should appoint new counsel at this time. In essence, he's trying
to get new counsel to handle Rule 35 - excuse me, post-conviction relief.
Post-conviction relief has a process for the appointment of counsel and if
postured correctly the Court certainly would consider that request. ...
But, again, I am going to deny the Motions as filed, but I'm going to
deny them without prejudice and certainly the Defendant can pursue these
issues on post-conviction if he wishes to file a Petition that complies with
the law ....
But at this time the Court finds that there's no manifest injustice
alleged except for ineffective assistance of counsel issues. Certainly the
Defendant isn't arguing that he was innocent. If he was, then the Court
would take a very different look at this, but the Defendant is basically
arguing that he disagreed with Defense Counsel's handling of the case
and that typically is a post-conviction relief matter.
(6/24/13 Tr., p.21, L.6 - p.22, L.8; see also Augmentation: "Order Denying All Pending
Motions" (hereinafter "Order"), filed June 24, 2013.) The court also denied Bias' Rule
35 motion for reduction of sentence, finding in light of Bias' extensive criminal record
and history of driving under the influence that "the original sentence imposed in this
matter was appropriate." (6/24/13 Tr., p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.21; see also Order.)

Course Of Proceedings On Appeal
On appeal, Bias challenged the denial of his motion for substitute counsel to
pursue his post-judgment motions.

Specifically, he argued, "based on both his
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constitutional right to counsel and his statutory right to counsel," that (1) the district court
was required to appoint substitute counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and motion for reduction of sentence because an actual conflict of
interest existed between Bias and his previously appointed attorney, and (2) the court
erred by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into the basis for Bias' request for
substitute counsel. 1 (Brief of Appellant, pp.5-12.)
The Court of Appeals implicitly rejected Bias' claim that he had a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions.

See generally

Opinion, pp.3-8. It held, however, that Bias had a statutory right to counsel under l.C. §
19-852 and that, to effectuate that right, the district court had a duty, arising out of the
Sixth Amendment and procedural due process, to inquire into the basis of Bias' request
for substitute counsel before ruling on the motion. Opinion, pp.3-8. In so holding, the
Court of Appeals rejected the state's argument - which was based on this Court's
opinions in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), and Hall v. State, 155
Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013), as well as on the Court of Appeals' prior opinion in
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) - that the statutory
"right" to counsel in post-judgment proceedings is not coextensive with the constitutional
right to counsel and therefore the district court was not required to follow the procedures
required under the Sixth Amendment to rule on Bias' request for substitute counsel.
(See Brief of Respondent, pp.10-14.) Instead, relying almost exclusively on cases in

1

Bias also raised as an issue on appeal whether the district court abused its sentencing
discretion. (Brief of Appellant, pp.12-14.) Because the Court of Appeals vacated and
remanded on the substitute counsel issue, it did not reach Bias' excessive sentence
claim. If this Court grants review, the state relies on its prior briefing for argument on
the sentencing issue. (See Brief of Respondent, pp.16-20.)
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which the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals held
that the district court had a duty of inquiry in this case. Opinion, pp.4-6.
The Court of Appeals also implicitly rejected the state's argument that, having
disposed of Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims alleged therein would be better resolved in a collateral
post-conviction proceeding, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining
Bias' request for the appointment of counsel to pursue that motion in the post-judgment
phase of the criminal case. (See Brief of Respondent, pp.14-16.) Instead, the Court of
Appeals held the district court had an affirmative duty to inquire into the basis of Bias'
request for substitute counsel, regardless of the court's decision to forego consideration
of the merits of Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Opinion, pp.4-8. Because, in
the Court of Appeals' view, the district court "fail[ed] to gather the facts required to
properly adjudicate the motion for substitute counsel," the Court vacated the district
court's order denying Bias' motion for substitute counsel and remanded for what the
Court of Appeals deemed the required inquiry.

Id., p.8.

Although Bias did not

specifically challenge the denial of either his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or his
motion for reduction of sentence, the Court of Appeals nevertheless vacated the orders
on those motions, as well. "to permit the district court to decide those motions after Bias
is either appointed new counsel, if required, or offered the opportunity to proceed pro
se." Id.
The state filed a timely petition for review.
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ISSUE ON REVIEW
Is review appropriate because the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to
both Idaho Supreme Court precedent and prior Court of Appeals' precedent regarding
the scope of the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings?
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ARGUMENT
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Contrary To
Both Idaho Supreme Court Precedent And Prior Court of Appeals' Precedent Regarding
The Scope Of The Right To Counsel In Post-Conviction Proceedings

A

Introduction
The district court denied Bias' motion for the appointment of substitute counsel

to pursue his post-judgment motions for a reduction of sentence and to withdraw his
guilty plea, concluding the Rule 35 motion was meritless and the ineffective assistance
of counsel claims alleged in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea would be better
resolved in a collateral proceeding under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
("UPCPA").

(Order Denying All Pending Motions; see also 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 -

p.22, L.8.)

The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order based on its

determinations that Bias had a statutory right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment
motions; that the statutory right imposed upon the district court a duty, arising out of the
Sixth Amendment and procedural due process, to inquire of Bias personally regarding
the basis of his motion for substitute counsel; and that the district court "fail[ed] to gather
the facts required to properly adjudicate the motion." Opinion, pp.4-8. The Court of
Appeals' Opinion is incompatible with both this Court's precedent and prior Court of
Appeals' precedent regarding the scope of the right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings. Review by this Court is therefore appropriate.

B.

Standard Of Review

I.AR. 118(b).

Granting of review is discretionary.

Factors considered by the

Court in deciding whether to grant review include "[w]hether the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the
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Idaho Supreme Court," I.AR. 118(b)(2), and "[w]hether the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a previous decision of the Court of Appeals," I.AR.
118(b)(3).
In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, "this Court gives serious
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of
the lower court."

State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)

(quotations and citation omitted).

C.

Bias Had No Sixth Amendment Right To Be Represented By Counsel On His
Post-Judgment Motions For Leniency And To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel

during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. Estrada v. State,
143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981)); see also Hall v.
State, 155 Idaho 610, 615, 315 P.3d 798, 803 (2013) (citing Idaho Const., art. I, § 13;
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423, n.7 (2009)) ("Idaho law also
guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions.").
Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does not extend to postconviction proceedings.

Lawrence v.

Florida, 549 U.S.

327, 336-37 (2007);

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). See also Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho
389, 394, 327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752
(1991 )) ('"[T]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings."'); Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804 ("[T]he right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is not a constitutional right." (internal quotations and citations

g

omitted)).

A post-conviction petition brought pursuant to the UPCPA is a civil

proceeding and, thus, provides the clearest example of a post-conviction proceeding to
which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the correlative right to conflict-free
counsel, do not apply.

See Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804.

However,

collateral proceedings under the UPCPA are not the only post-conviction proceedings
exempt from the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Unless the proceeding at issue
constitutes a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution, a criminal defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to pursue it.

~.

Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561-62, 149 P.3d

at 836-37.
The determination of whether a particular stage of a criminal prosecution is
"critical" requires an analysis of '"whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice."'

& at 562, 149 P.3d at 837 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227). Conducting

this analysis in State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 456-58, 235 P.3d 404, 406-08 (Ct.
App. 2010) (review denied), the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held that a postjudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment and, as such, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to an
attorney to pursue such a motion. The Court reasoned:
[A] post-judgment motion to withdraw [a] guilty plea is far removed from
the trial process, where the potential for substantial prejudice is great, and
throughout which the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed.
During such a hearing prior to the entry of judgment, the presence of
counsel may help avoid prejudice to the defendant should the motion be
denied. For example, the success of counsel's argument at the prejudgment motion has an immediate effect on the defendant's sentence. In
contrast, unlike at trial, during a line-up, or during motions argued prior to
sentencing, a judgment of conviction has already been entered before a
post-judgment hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea takes place. Even
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if such a motion is denied, the defendant still has available the right to
appeal his or her conviction or to file an application for post-conviction
relief. As such, there is less potential for substantial prejudice to a
defendant's rights.

kl at 458, 235

P.3d at 408.

Like a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a post-judgment motion for
reconsideration of sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is also not a "critical
stage" of the criminal prosecution to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies.

United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th Cir.1991); but see

State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted) (stating
in dicta that "[a) criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages of the
criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion" but recognizing counsel can be
denied under l.C. § 19-852 if motion is frivolous). This is so because a Rule 35 motion

can "only benefit the defendant by reducing his sentence which had already become
final"; it is not "a do-over of [the] original sentencing proceeding."

United States v.

Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 537 (4th Cir. 2005). There is, therefore, no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel on a Rule 35 motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d at 537; United States v. Paloma,
80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996).
Because Bias had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment
motions for leniency and to withdraw his guilty plea, his claim on appeal that the district
court had a duty under the Sixth Amendment to inquire regarding the basis of his
request for substitute counsel and/or to appoint substitute counsel to pursue those
motions (see Brief of Appellant, pp.5-12) necessarily fails.
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D.

The Court Of Appeals' Conclusions That l.C. § 19-852 Creates A Statutory Right
To Counsel In Post-Judgment Proceedings And That Such Right Is Coextensive
With The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel In The Critical Stages Of A
Criminal Case Are Contrary To Prior Precedent And Merit Review By This Court
Idaho Code § 19-852 confers upon indigent criminal defendants the right to be

represented by counsel "at all stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when
a person providing his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney
and including revocation of probation," l.C. § 19-852(2)(a); "[t]o be represented in any
appeal," l.C. § 19-852(2)(b); and "[t]o be represented in any other post-conviction or
post-commitment proceeding that the attorney or the indigent person considers
appropriate, unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is not
a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at
his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding," l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) (emphasis
added). Consistent with the provisions of l.C. § 19-852(2), Bias was represented by the
county public defender throughout the criminal proceedings, up to and including the
time of judgment.

(See R., pp.23, 27, 33, 39-42, 45-46, 48-49, 53-54; 2/11/13 Tr.;

3/18/13 Tr.; 6/24/13 Tr.) After he was sentenced Bias, through appointed counsel, filed
a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.53-54.) He also filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his guilty plea (Motion to Withdraw Plea) and a motion for the
appointment of substitute counsel, asserting that his previously appointed attorney
"failed to adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit," thus "caus[ing] the Attorney/Client
relationship to become irreparably damaged" (Motion for Counsel, ,-r4).

The district

court denied the motion for substitute counsel, reasoning the Rule 35 motion was
meritless and Bias' request to withdraw his guilty plea - a request based on allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel - would be more appropriately addressed in a
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separate action for post-conviction relief.

(6/24/13 Tr., p.19, L.7 - p.22, L.8; Order

Denying Motions.)
Citing the standards applicable to the right to conflict-free counsel conferred by
the Sixth Amendment, Bias argued on appeal that the district court, having become
aware of an "actual conflict of interest" between trial counsel and Bias, was required to
appoint substitute counsel to assist Bias in pursing his post-judgment motions and was
also required to inquire of Bias personally regarding the basis of his request. (Brief of
Appellant, pp.5-12.) Although the Court of Appeals appears to have recognized that
Bias had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions,
see Opinion, pp.3-4 (noting Bias' entitlement to counsel arose from l.C. § 19-852), it
nevertheless held the district court had a duty to inquire of Bias personally regarding the
basis of his request for substitute counsel based on its determination that Bias had a
statutory right to counsel to which the procedural framework of the Sixth Amendment
applied, Opinion, pp.4-8. The Court of Appeals' holding is incompatible with existing
precedent.
There is no question that, in cases where a criminal defendant enjoys a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, such right also "include[s] the right to be represented by
conflict-free counsel." Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 615, 315 P.3d 798, 803 (2013)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Nor is there any question that, in order to
safeguard the right to conflict-free counsel, "a trial court has an affirmative duty to
inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or reasonably should know that a
particular conflict may exist."

~

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The trial

court had no such duty in this case, however, because Bias had no Sixth Amendment
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right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions; and this Court's precedents make
clear that Bias' his conditional entitlement to counsel under l.C. § 18-852(2)(c) did not
confer upon him any statutory right to conflict-free counsel to which the procedural
protections of the Sixth Amendment would apply.
In Murphy v. State, supra, this Court analyzed in what circumstances a statutory
"right" to counsel also carries with it the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel
and conflict-free counsel. The Court distinguished between statutes that mandate the
appointment of post-conviction counsel versus those that leave the decision to appoint
counsel within the district court's discretion. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at
370-71.

Citing Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2, which "provides for the mandatory

appointment of counsel for post-conviction review after the imposition of the death
penalty," the Court noted its recent holding in Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _ , 315
P.3d 798, 804 (2013), "that post-conviction petitioners sentenced to death have the right
to conflict-free counsel." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 370-71. The Court
then contrasted Rule 44.2 with l.C. § 19-4904, which leaves the decision to appoint
post-conviction counsel in a non-capital case within the discretion of the district court.

JsL at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. Because the appointment of counsel under l.C. § 19-4904
is discretionary, the Murphy Court observed that that statute does not even "create a
statutory right to post-conviction counsel," id. (citing Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291,
17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000)), much less a right to the effective assistance of counsel in
non-capital post-conviction proceedings. See

!st

("Where there is no right to counsel,

there can be no deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel."). Thus, the Court
effectively held that only statutes making the appointment of counsel mandatory confer
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upon indigent litigants the rights normally associated with the Sixth Amendment, such
as the rights to the effective assistance of counsel and conflict-free counsel. Compare
Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995) (right to appointed
counsel on appeal guaranteed by l.C. § 19-852 includes right to appointed counsel to
pursue petition for review and therefore Sixth Amendment framework of analysis
applied to defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel); Smith
v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-34, 203 P.3d 1221, 1232-33 (2009) (statute mandating
appointment of counsel to challenge designation as a Violent Sexual Predator conferred
upon indigent petitioner the right to effective assistance of counsel coextensive with the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment).
Recognizing that a post-conviction petitioner has no constitutional or statutory
right to counsel, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340,
160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) (review denied), that the procedures required to rule on
a request for substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings. The Court reasoned:
[W]e are not persuaded by Rios-Lopez's reliance on cases addressing the
procedures necessary to rule on a criminal defendant's request to
substitute counsel in criminal proceedings. See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho
712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002); State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898,
606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d
1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997). Both a criminal defendant and an applicant
for post-conviction relief may be appointed a substitute counsel if good
cause is shown for such substitution. See l.C. § 19-856. However,
determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel for a criminal
defendant differs from determining whether good cause exists to
substitute counsel for an applicant for post-conviction relief because the
underlying rights to counsel differ.
A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel; but, in Idaho, an applicant for postconviction relief does not even have a statutory right to counsel. See
Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 & n. 1, 908 P.2d at 595 & n. 1. See also l.C. §
19-4904. Indeed, a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
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counsel may not be brought because the applicant for post-conviction
relief does not have a right to effective assistance of counsel. See
Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902-03, 908 P.2d at 595-96. Because Nath,
Clayton, and Peck address the procedures necessary to protect a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in
criminal proceedings, those cases are inapposite.
Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79.
Like Rios-Lopez, the Court of Appeals in this case relied almost exclusively on
cases that address "the procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings" as the
basis for its determination that the district court had a duty to inquire before ruling on
Bias' motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. See Opinion, pp.4-6 (citing, inter
alia, State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980); State v. Nath, 137 Idaho

712, 52 P.3d 857 (2002); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 946 P.2d 1351 (Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 2007)). But, as in Rios-Lopez,
those cases are "inapposite" because Bias had no constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel to pursue his post-judgments and, contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding,
Bias did not "enjoy[] a right to counsel" pursuant to l.C. § 19-852.

Opinion, pp.7-8

(emphasis in original).
The appointment of counsel to pursue a "post-conviction or post-commitment
proceeding," other than a probation revocation proceeding or direct appeal in a criminal
case, is specifically governed by l.C. § 19-852(2)(c).

Unlike subsections (2)(a) and

(2)(b) of l.C. § 19-852, which provide that an indigent defendant is unconditionally
entitled to be represented by an attorney at all critical stages of a criminal case,
including an appeal, subsection (2)(c) of the statute permits the denial of appointed
counsel to pursue a post-judgment motion if "the court in which the proceeding is

16

brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous
proceeding." In this way, l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) is virtually indistinguishable from l.C. § 194904 - the statute governing the appointment of counsel in collateral post-conviction
proceedings that this Court noted in Murphy, supra, makes the appointment of counsel
discretionary with the district court.

Because l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) likewise makes the

appointment of counsel discretionary, and because Bias had no constitutional right to be
represented by counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions, the procedures mandated
by the Sixth Amendment to guarantee effective assistance - such as the duty to inquire
into conflicts of interest - did not apply. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 37071; Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79.

The Court of Appeals'

conclusion to the contrary is incompatible with Murphy and merits review by this Court.

D.

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Bias' Motion For The
Appointment Of Substitute Counsel To Pursue His Post-Judgment Motions On
The Uncontested Grounds That The Proceedings Were Frivolous And/Or Would
Be More Appropriately Pursued In A Different Forum
'"A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a

showing of good cause."' State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 297 P.3d 244 (2013) (quoting
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009)); see also State v.
Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012). "Whether substitute
counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion." Severson, 147 Idaho
at 702, 215 P.3d at 422 (citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860
(2002)). "The trial court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it
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violated the defendant's right to counsel."

kl (citing

Nath, 137 Idaho at 715, 52 P.3d at

860).
Bias argued on appeal the district court was required to appoint substitute
counsel to represent him on post-judgment motions for leniency and to withdraw his
guilty plea because the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he alleged in that
motion "created an actual conflict of interest as trial counsel had a personal interest in
seeing those claims denied." (Brief of Appellant, pp.6-7.) Applying a Sixth Amendment
framework, the Court of Appeals held that, at a minimum, the district court had a duty to
inquire into the basis of Bias' request for substitute counsel before denying his motion.
Opinion, pp.4-8.

There is no question that, in circumstances where an indigent

defendant has a right to counsel, an actual conflict of interest constitutes "good cause"
mandating the appointment of substitute counsel.

~,

Lippert, 152 Idaho at _ , 276

P.3d at 759. As discussed above, however, Bias had no constitutional right to counsel
to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, State v. Hartshorn, 149
Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010), and any statutory entitlement to counsel
depended on the viability of the motion, see l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) (no entitlement to
counsel to pursue frivolous post-conviction or post-commitment proceedings).
The district court, in its discretion, determined that Bias' Rule 35 motion was not
well-founded and demonstrated no basis for reduction of his sentence. The court also
determined Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea failed to satisfy the "manifest
injustice" standard of l.C.R. 33, and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
alleged therein would be "more appropriately determined under Idaho's Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act." (Order Denying All Pending Motions; see also 6/24/13 Tr.,
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p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8.) In making these determinations, which Bias has not challenged
on appeal, the district court effectively ruled that Bias' post-judgment motions were not
ones a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own
expense in the criminal proceeding. Because the motions were frivolous, Bias was not
statutorily entitled to counsel, much less substitute counsel, to pursue the motion. l.C.

§§ 19-852, 19-856.
Even assuming Bias had a statutory right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he has failed to show the existence of any "actual
conflict of interest" that would have mandated the appointment of substitute counsel.
Trial counsel did not argue the merits of Bias' motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea
(see 6/24/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.22), and the district court denied the motion
without prejudice on the basis that the issues presented therein would be more
appropriately addressed in a separate post-conviction action (see Order Denying
Motions; 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8).

In so ruling, the district court actually

avoided any potential conflict that would have arisen had trial counsel been required to

argue the merits of the motion and litigate his own alleged ineffectiveness.

Because

Bias has not challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea - and, more
particularly, the court's determination that the claims therein would be better disposed of
in a separate post-conviction action - he has failed to show any abuse of discretion in
the denial of his motion for substitute counsel to pursue that motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review, affirm
the district court's order denying Bias' motion for substitute counsel to pursue his postjudgment motions to withdraw his guilty plea and for a reduction of sentence.
DATED this

5th

day of January, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of January, 2015, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REVIEW by causing a copy addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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KIDWELL, Judge Pro Tern
William Jack Bias was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. After
he was sentenced, he filed several motions, including a motion for substitute counsel and an
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, seeking leniency regarding his sentence. His motions were
denied and Bias appealed. He argues that the court erred by denying his motion for substitute
counsel and proceeding to decide his other motions. He also argues that the district court failed
to adequately consider mitigating factors at sentencing.

I.
BACKGROUND
Bias was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation
of Idaho Code § 18-8004 and with misdemeanor injury to a child in violation of LC. § 181501 (3). The State also filed a charging enhancement pursuant to LC. § 18-8005(6), alleging

1

that Bias had been previously convicted of three prior DUis. After the public defender was
appointed to represent him, the injury to a child charge was dismissed and Bias pleaded guilty to
the DUI charge. After a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified term of ten years with
five years determinate.
Nearly a month after the sentence had been pronounced, Bias filed a Rule 35 motion,
through counsel, seeking leniency on his sentence. Two months later, before the Rule 35 motion
was adjudicated, Bias filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a motion for the
appointment of substitute counsel. Both motions relied upon the assertion that counsel and Bias
had discussed the case after Bias pleaded guilty. At that time, Bias "questioned [his attorney]
about an issue [Bias] had brought up previously, and [the attorney's] response was, 'Yeah, we
could have argued that, before you plead[ed] Guilty."' Bias argued that the poor advice was a
sufficient basis for the withdrawal of his plea and "caused the Attorney/Client relationship to
become irreparably damaged" warranting the appointment of substitute counsel.

Bias also

requested an order authorizing transportation from the prison so that he could be present at any
hearing.
The court held a hearing on the pending motions. 1 At the hearing, the court denied the
Rule 35 motion, without prejudice, after reviewing the mitigating and aggravating factors it had
considered at sentencing. Next, it held that Bias had failed to prove manifest injustice, the
requirement to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing. Finally, it discussed the motion for
substitute counsel. In the court's view, Bias was attempting to have counsel appointed for a
potential post-conviction action before filing a petition and without following the procedures set
forth by statute. The court asked counsel to inform Bias that these issues would be better raised
in post-conviction proceedings and that counsel might be available through those proceedings.
Thereafter, the district court entered a written order denying the pending motions. It
ruled that the motion for new counsel was "deemed unnecessary, given the appointment of
appellate counsel." 2 It denied the Rule 35 motion because the sentence was 'just and appropriate

The motion for transport appears to have been implicitly denied as Bias was not present
at the hearing.
2

Bias had already filed a notice of appeal intending to challenge his sentence. The district
court appointed the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender to pursue the appeal.

2

under the circumstances," given the defendant's prior criminal record and other factors discussed
at the sentencing. It denied Bias's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on alternative grounds.
First, the court held that the motion was not timely. 3 Second, it held that Bias failed to meet his
burden, a showing of manifest injustice. Finally, it noted that Bias was permitted to pursue these
claims in post-conviction proceedings.
Bias filed a timely appeal and contends that the court erred by denying his motion for the
appointment of counsel for two reasons. First, Bias argues that upon the filing of his motion for
substitute counsel "a duty is triggered and the district court must afford the defendant the
opportunity to explain the basis for the request." Because Bias was not present, either in person
or telephonically, he was denied the right to give that explanation. Second, Bias argues that the
court should have granted the motion because he had a Sixth Amendment and statutory right to
counsel for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and representation by an attorney with an
actual conflict of interest does not satisfy the right to counsel. As a remedy, Bias requests a
remand with instructions to allow him to have a proper hearing, with new counsel on both the
Rule 35 motion and the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Bias also argues that the district
court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion.

II.
ANALYSIS

The parties primarily dispute the nature of Bias's right to the effective assistance of
counsel. In our view, those cases are inapposite. 4 Here, counsel had already been appointed.
Furthermore, Bias was statutorily entitled to counsel pursuant to LC. § 19-852 unless his motions

3

Idaho Criminal Rule 33 authorizes post-judgment motions to withdraw a guilty plea. The
motion was filed June 4, 2013, seventy-eight days after the judgment of conviction was filed on
March 18, 2013. Because Bias filed a direct appeal, his motion appears to be timely. State v.
Wegner, 148 Idaho 270, 272, 220 P.3d 1089, 1091 (2009) (holding that absent a statute or rule
extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal); State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (same).
4

The right to effective assistance of counsel is critical in post-conviction cases where that
right is a predicate to certain collateral attacks. Here, Bias is not bringing a collateral attack on
his conviction.

3

were frivolous. 5

Therefore, even if the State could show that Bias was not entitled to the

effective assistance of counsel, he was entitled to the adjudication of his motion for substitute
counsel.

A.

The Court's Duty to Inquire
Both the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that a trial court

is obligated to apply certain procedures when a person seeks substitute counsel. In State v.

Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606 P .2d 1000, 1002 (1980), the Court held that "after having been
made aware by the court of the problems involved" the trial court has an obligation "to afford
[the] defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of his
motion for substitution of counsel."
In State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997), the duty to
inquire was triggered by the defendant's complaint that he was dissatisfied with counsel and the
indication that he wanted to "fire counsel." The duty was not mitigated by the fact that the
defendant was "ill-behaved and disruptive during court proceedings" or because the court
suspected that the defendant merely sought substitute counsel as a delay tactic.
The exact scope of the duty to inquire is fact-dependent. Generally, it is not permissible
to refuse to allow a defendant "to speak on the subject." State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52
P.3d 857, 860 (2002); see also State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 598, 181P.3d512, 524 (Ct. App.
2007) (J. Lansing dissenting) (the dissent distinguishes an inquiry from cutting the defendant off
5

The relevant portions ofldaho Code § 19-852 state:
( 1) An indigent person who is ... being detained under a conviction of, a serious
crime, is entitled:
(a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having
his own counsel is so entitled; and
(2) An indigent person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under
subsection (I) of this section is entitled:
(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction or post-commitment
proceeding that the attorney or the indigent person considers appropriate,
unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is
not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be
willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous
proceeding.
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and refusing to let him explain his claim to the court). But, a more limited duty to inquire is
imposed when a defendant "at best hinted that he was dissatisfied with [his attorney's]
performance on only one occasion" and took "no initiative to request substitute counsel." State
v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285, 297 P.3d 244, 248 (2013). Under those facts, it is sufficient to ask
a defendant if he has any questions, and move on if he fails to raise any complaints about
counsel. Id. at 285-86; 297 P.3d at 248-49. Finally, where the nature of the issues between
counsel and client has been set forth, but the record is insufficient to determine whether relief is
required, the court has a duty to investigate so that there exists a proper basis for a ruling.
Lippert, 145Idahoat596,181 P.3dat522.
The defendant's right to an inquiry flows from several interrelated constitutional
guarantees. The first is the right to effective assistance of counsel, provided at state expense for
the indigent, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Peck, 130 Idaho at 712-13, 946 P.2d at
1352-53; see also Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995) ("We can see
no legitimate basis for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed by LC. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has
been a violation of a similar constitutional right."). But the right to an inquiry is not wholly
dependent upon the right to effective assistance. The right to an inquiry also flows from a
defendant's constitutional right to refuse counsel and proceed pro se. Peck, 130 Idaho at 713-14,
946 P.2d at 1353-54 ("An accused also has the right to waive court-appointed counsel and to
conduct his own defense." In that case, remand was required because the defendant "was not
given a meaningful opportunity to justify his request for substitute counsel or to exercise his
right to represent himself" (emphasis added)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819
(1975) (holding that the right to self-represent is implicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment).
Finally, some inquiry may be guaranteed by procedural due process. See Rios-Lopez v. State,
144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) (The post-conviction petitioner did not enjoy
a constitutionally-protected right to counsel; nonetheless, the court considered whether an
inquiry was sufficient under general procedural due process principles. Although the right to an
inquiry cases were not binding precedent, they were discussed as persuasive authority.).
In this case, we conclude that the district court erred by ruling on the motion for
substitute counsel before gathering the facts required to adjudicate the motion. In Lippert, the
defendant asserted that counsel had failed to adequately consult with him. We held that this
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general averment warranted further investigation and that the district court's failure to "make any
meaningful determination" warranted a remand. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594, 181 P.3d at 522.
Conversely, in Rios-Lopez, where the petitioner did not enjoy the right to effective assistance of
counsel, this Court affirmed the denial of the motion for substitute counsel, decided in the
petitioner's absence only after concluding that the arguments were "clearly set forth" and that
"his presence would have added little to the proceedings." Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343, 160
P.3d at 1278. On balance, we conclude this case is analogous to Lippert. In this case, Bias made
general averments and the court's failure to develop an adequate factual basis to adjudicate the
motion limits our review. Accordingly, we must remand to allow the district court to gather the
facts required to adjudicate this motion. Moreover, should the court conclude that Bias is not
entitled to substitute counsel, the court should also determine whether Bias wishes to proceed
prose. 6
B.

Murphy Does Not Control the Disposition of This Case

The State also argues that Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014) has
changed the law concerning the link between a statutory right to counsel and the guarantee of
effective counsel.

It argues that "the Court effectively held that only statutes making the

appointment of counsel mandatory confer upon indigent litigants the right, normally associated
with the Sixth Amendment, to the effective assistance of counsel." (emphasis added).
In Murphy, the Court first noted that "the United States Supreme Court has held that there
is no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction." Id.
at 394, 327 P.3d at 370 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)). It then noted two
general rules.

First, the appointment of counsel in post-conviction actions is discretionary.

Second, ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is not a "ground for relief." Both holdings
are entirely consistent with prior law. See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d
1108, 1111 (2004) (discussing the availability of counsel in post-conviction proceedings); Lee v.

State, 122 Idaho 196, 198, 832 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1992) (explaining that ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel is not a basis upon which a person can collaterally attack a conviction or
sentence); Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902-03, 908 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Ct. App. 1995)
(discussing the relationship between ineffective assistance of counsel and the right to a
6

Because we remand for a consideration of Bias's right to substitute counsel, we need not
determine whether the court erred by denying Rule 35 relief.
6

"remedy"); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining
that proper collateral attacks challenge "allegedly improper convictions and sentences" not the
proceedings in prior post-conviction actions).
Although Murphy did not change the law regarding the availability of counsel in postconviction proceedings, it did change the law concerning I.C. § 19-4908.

That provision

generally bars successive petitions for post-conviction relief, "unless the court finds a ground for
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental, or amended application."

l.C. § 19-4908.

In Murphy, the Court

concluded that its prior holding, that ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel could
be a "sufficient reason," was inconsistent with its view that the same ineffectiveness was not
"ground for relief" and overruled that prior holding.
We do not believe that the State's argument is relevant to these proceedings. First, as
stated above, we do not believe that the right to effective assistance of counsel is at issue in this
case.

Second, the Idaho Supreme Court exhibited special concern regarding the effect of

successive petitions on Idaho's criminal justice system:
Defendants have made a sham out of the system of justice and thwarted
imposition of their ultimate penalty with continuous petitions for relief that often
present claims without a legal foundation.

Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371 (quoting Bejarano v. Warden, State Prison, 929 P.2d
922, 925 (1996)) (emphasis added). Here, there is no possibility of "continuous" petitioning; a
defendant raising claims in post-judgment motions gets exactly the same process as any other
criminal defendant--proceedings in the trial court, a direct appeal, and a single collateral attack in
state courts. Thus, there is little risk that frivolous claims regarding post-judgment motions will
make a "sham out of the system" by their continuous filings.
Third, the statutes discussing the availability of counsel are distinguishable. As to a
petition for post-conviction relief, the appointment of counsel is plainly discretionary. Idaho
Code § 19-4904 states that "a court-appointed attorney may be made available to the applicant in
the preparation of the application." (emphasis added).

Conversely, a person raising post-

judgment claims in the original criminal action "is entitled . .. [t]o be represented by an attorney
to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled." LC. § 19-852 (emphasis
added). The standard is clarified by l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) which explains that the right does not
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extend to frivolous proceedings. While the court has discretion when adjudicating the standard
set forth in I.C. § 19-852(2)(c ), the fact remains that the defendant enjoys a right to counsel. See

Hallv. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013) (citing Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 687,
905 P .2d at 88 for the proposition holding that LC. § 19-852 creates a right to counsel); State v.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 n.7, 215 P.3d 414, 423 n.7 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-852 for the
proposition that "Idaho law also guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel").

III.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the court erred by failing to gather the facts required to properly adjudicate
the motion for substitute counsel. Accordingly, our ability to review is limited and we must
remand. Because we remand the motion for substitute counsel, we must also vacate the court's
decisions on the other motions to permit the district court to decide those motions after Bias is
either appointed new counsel, if required, or offered the opportunity to proceed pro se.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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